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Resolving consumer disputes:  Out of the courts and 





In the last decade in Australia private dispute resolution schemes have come to play an 
increasingly central role in resolving consumer disputes with private industry.  Indeed, 
the increase in consumer use of private dispute resolution schemes since 1990 has been 
described as "exponential" (Ben Slade & Christian Mikula, "How to use industry based 
consumer dispute resolution schemes…and why", NSW Law Society Journal, February 
1998, at 58).  For example, in 1997 alone it was estimated that more than 130 000 
consumers relied upon these schemes to resolve disputes, 4 years later in 2001 just two 
private dispute resolution schemes were responsible for resolving that same number of 
complaints (the Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman and the Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman as per their Annual Reports).    There is no doubt that the 
exponential growth in consumer usage of such schemes will continue given the Federal 
and State government's commitment to privatizing dispute resolution, through 
"…providing alternatives to the Courts, and to providing faster, cheaper, and simpler 
access to justice" (Media release, Commonwealth Attorney General, 13 June 2001, 
'Standards for Alternative Dispute Resolution Launched' ).   
 
 
What is private dispute resolution? 
Private dispute resolution (PDR) offers consumers an alternative to court based resolution 
of disputes.  The aim of the private dispute resolution schemes is to provide an alternative 
to the often lengthy and costly legal avenues of complaint resolution by providing 
consumers free, independent, just, informal and quick resolution of their complaints with 
private industry.  Generally schemes which provide private dispute resolution will take 
into account a broader range of factors than a court, adopting a more inquisitorial than 
adversarial style which benefits both the consumer and the industry member.   
 
Private dispute resolution schemes are provided for consumer use where a dispute has not 
been resolved through the internal dispute resolution (IDR) processes offered by a 
particular industry member.   In this sense these schemes operate as a last resort.  Once 
receiving a complaint the schemes will assess its merit, request further information and 
investigate as necessary. Any decision by the scheme will be binding upon the industry 
member and upon the consumer, if the consumer accepts it.  Consumers have the choice 
of pursuing court action if unhappy with the outcome.  The structure and jurisdiction of 
these schemes is not prescribed by legislation but by terms of reference accepted 
voluntarily by the relevant industry (Ben Slade & Christian Mikula, "How to use industry 
based consumer dispute resolution schemes…and why", NSW Law Society Journal, 
February 1998, at 60).  The schemes are funded by the members of industry they 
investigate.   
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There are differences between schemes.  Such differences include: client coverage (ie: 
some schemes cover small businesses as well as individual consumers);  the amount of 
compensation the scheme can order an industry member to pay a consumer whose 
complaint is proven and powers of investigation such as the ability to demand documents.  
These differences are unsurprising once it is noted how diverse the schemes are in terms 
of the nature of industries covered and their individual composition.  Examples of such 
national schemes are: 
 Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman (ABIO) 
 Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) 
 General Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Scheme 
 Private Health Insurance Ombudsman 
 Financial Industry Complaints Service  
 Life Insurance Complaints Scheme (LICS) 
 Credit Union Dispute Reference Centre 
 Mortgage Industry Ombudsman Scheme (MIOS) 
 Ausralian Direct Marketing Association (adma) 
 
Examples of state based schemes include: 
 Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria (EWOV) 
 Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW (EWON) 
 Electricity Industry Ombudsman SA  
 Electricity Ombudsman (TAS) 
 Legal Ombudsman (Victoria) 
 
 
Why has industry based private dispute resolution increased exponentially? 
Government policies of privatisatising and corporatising government services has 
resulted in the transfer of much essential service delivery, such as water, electricity, gas 
and telecommunications from the public to the private sector.  This shift to privatisation 
is driven by a belief that the market and competition will provide more efficient and 
responsive services for consumers that will government ownership and regulation 
(Bronwyn Naylor 'Privatisation : a sell-off of public accountability?' http://www-
pso.adm.monash.edu.au/news accessed 16/4/02). Dispute-settling mechanisms are a very 
necessary part of dealing with market failure (Mayer E The Role of regulatory 
Enforcement in the Australian Economy Regulation and Australia's Future, Grabosky P 
& Braithwaite J (eds) , Australian Studies in Law, Crime and Justice, 1993 at 102) and as 
government privatises industry, thereby removing traditional public law methods of 
dispute resolution, it has promoted the concept of disputes being resolved by industry 
itself:  
The Government is committed to encouraging the use of alternative 
dispute resolution systems to resolve consumer disputes.  This includes 
the further development of non-litigious avenues for consumer redress 
such as industry-based Ombudsman schemes, mediation and small 
claims tribunals.  
(Report by the Commonwealth Department of the Treasury 
consumerredressstudy, June 1999 at 5) 
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This promotion of industry schemes is a direct result of government policy aimed in part 
at shifting the economic burden of regulation away from private taxpayers onto public 
entities (Shearing CD 'A Constitutine Conception of regulation Business Regulation and 
Australia's Future, Grabosky P & Braithwaite J (eds) , Australian Studies in Law, Crime 
and Justice, 1993 at 69).  The plethora of private industry dispute resolution schemes are 
a direct result of  this 'new' multi-faceted view of regulation.    The traditional regulatory 
mechanism of black-letter law is no longer viewed by government as providing the only 
nor necessarily the ‘best’ form of regulation for private industry.   Government policy is 
adopting regulatory alternatives for newly privatized and corporatised industries.  For 
example, the recent government report, aptly titled,  "Grey-Letter Law"  (Report of the 
Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, 9 September 1999) 
establishes 3 alternative regulatory forms, noting that the boundaries between these 3 
regulatory options is often blurred:   
 
1. Explicit government regulation or black letter law - classified as consisting of 2 
groups - primary and subordinate legislation. 
 
2.  Quasi-regulation -  defined as referring "to the range of rules, instruments and 
standards where government influences business to comply, but which does not form part 
of explicit government regulation" (Report of the Commonwealth Interdepartmental 
Committee on Quasi-regulation, 9 September 1999at 7). 
 
3.  Self regulation - defined as "any regulatory regime which has generally been 
developed and funded by industry, and is enforced exclusively by industry." (Report of 
the Commonwealth Interdepartmental Committee on Quasi-regulation, 9 September 
1999at 7). 
 
The increased use of private industry dispute resolution schemes created and controlled 
by the industry they receive complaints about is clearly a result of this change in business 
regulation from explicit government regulation to self-regulation (Christopher Hood, 
'Public Administration and Public Policy: Intellectual Challenges for the 1990s' 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 48(4) December 1989 at 350). The 
increasing proliferation of such schemes reflects the interest government and industry 
have shown in the last 15 years towards increasing self-regulation.  The carrot/stick for 
the private sector is that unless self-regulation works legislation will be introduced. (Bean 
AD, 'A Guide to the Private Alternative Dispute Resolution Schemes' (1994) 5(3) 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 200-203 at 203).  While this carrot/stick is 
working for industry, the result for consumers seems less clear.  
 
What are the (dis)advantages of such schemes for consumers? 
It seems that the jury is still out on a definitive answer to the general question as to 
whether consumers benefit through the presence of private industry dispute resolution 




1.  Offer an alternative to courts 
A clear advantage to consumers is that the schemes do offer swift and cheap justice.  
While they do not offer a guarantee that the consumer will win they do allow consumers 
the opportunity to have their complaint resolved independently and fairly. Further, the 
schemes do not leave the consumer open to costs if the complaint proves unsuccessful.   
 
Of course, as such schemes are not courts they are also open to criticisms including:   
 a perception by consumers of a lack of independence from industry.  As the 
schemes are funded and created by the industry they investigate (normally 
members pay fees to the scheme based upon the percentage of total complaints 
against them) there is the possibility of a perceived if not actual lack of 
independence;  
 as the schemes are contractually based they are not open to legal challenge in 
terms of their jurisdiction or composition; 
 whether such schemes are effective in ensuring  that consumers know where to go 
to lodge a complaint and whether the scheme is broad enough to resolve it (Robert 
Drake, 'Justice goes feral' Consuming Interest 62 1995 at 20). 
 
2. Sanctions 
Even though the schemes do not have the power of courts some schemes do have the 
capacity to make binding determinations upon members.  For example, the TIO may 
make determinations of up to $10 000 upon members of the scheme to pay compensation 
or to take corrective action and may also make recommendations up to $50 000. 
 
However it is also precisely because the schemes are not courts there are very real 
limitations upon their ability to impose sanctions.  The sanctions the schemes can impose 
upon industry are not extensive when compared to courts.  Very rarely are institutions or 
industry members named for bad behaviour.  Public shaming does not play a role in the 
sanctions available to these schemes.  Also there is no room for punitive measures to be 
placed upon industry.  Indeed some ADR schemes have very limited ability to impose 
sanctions (eg: LIC) or do so rarely (eg: ABIO).  It can be argued that whereas an adverse  
court finding against an industry member presumably impacts upon industry behaviour 
through its precedent value, an adverse finding by an industry dispute resolution scheme 
does not have the same legal force and will therefore prima facie fail to regulate or 
improve industry standards. 
 
3.  The schemes offer a window into systemic issues 
A positive outcome for consumers is that the schemes are able to offer insight into 
industry processes that the court system is unable to provide.  As such, and if properly 
run, the schemes are able to improve overall industry practice (interview with Louise 
Sylvan, 26 March 2002, CONUMERS?? ).  The schemes have regular contact with 
industry resulting in the development of specialist knowledge which places the schemes 
in a unique position to encourage effective complaint handling processes and to promote 
standards of "good industry practice" (Christian Mikula, 'Ho healthy is LICS?' Consumer 
Rights Journal 2(5) July/August 1998). This may result in schemes having input into self-
regulation of industry - for example the creation of industry codes of practice.  For 
 5 
example, the TIO not only has jurisdiction to investigate breaches of Industry Codes but 
also may assist other regulatory agencies such as the government regulator (Australian 
Communications Authority 'ACA'), industry codes will not be registered with the ACA 
unless the ACA is satisfied that the TIO has been consulted.   
 
Conversely, there is no assurance that all systemic issues will be addressed or are being 
addressed.  While the schemes ensure a measure of transparency and information sharing 
through annual reporting mechanisms such as issuing annual reports, the information 
contained in such reports is of a general nature.  This means for example that the type and 
amount of complaints about particular industry members is not transparently reported.  
Consequently there is no means of mounting public pressure to reform an industry 
member through these industry schemes. 
 
4. Scheme coverage 
The relationship of schemes to their industry does differ.  For example, not all schemes 
cover all industry members.  For example LICS and the General Insurance Enquiries and 
Complaints Scheme are voluntary schemes whereas the Telecommunications Industry 
Ombudsman scheme is compulsory for industry members described in part 10 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997.  From a consumer perspective this lack of uniform 
scheme coverage not only fails to provide them with an avenue for complaint resolution 
but may also lead to difficulty discerning the 'correct' avenues for dispute resolution.  
Further, while most schemes have consumer representatives on their Boards/governing 
councils, the proportion of consumer representatives to industry member representatives 
and the nature and impact of their role has been the object of debate and discussion.  
 
4. Consumer - protected by the schemes?  
The National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) found that 
while client satisfaction with ADR is generally high (see  
<www.nadrac.gov.au/aghome/advisory/nadrac/QandAonreport.thm accessed 14/8/02>.  
there are also specific problems and risks associated with ADR.  As a result NADRAC 
has developed standards which rely upon a self regulatory approach.  NADRAC believes 
that this will ensure the consistency across the entire ADR field which consumers require.   
 
Arguably there are aspects of industry/consumer relations that perhaps should not be 
regulated through the individual process of complaint resolution but rather  approached 
with general regulation.  Louise Sylvan from the >>>>> gave the example of onerous 
contractual terms for consumers - these terms cannot be dealt with on an individual 
complaints basis but require intervention for consumer protection.   
 
 
How are these scheme regulated? 
The authority of a private dispute resolution processes is dependent upon public and 
industry perception of them as legitimate (Roman Tomasic 'Administrative law reform: 
Who Benefits?' Administrative law 12(6) 1987 at 263).  As the private dispute resolution 
schemes are self-regulating and therefore not authorized nor regulated through 
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government legislation the perception of legitimation must be found in the following 
regulatory alternatives to black-letter law which apply to the schemes: 
 Benchmarks for Industry-Based Customer Dispute Resolution Schemes 
 Standards Australia - AS 4269-1995 & AS4609-1999 
 
Benchmarks for Industry-Based Customer Dispute Resolution Schemes  
Described as "important and influential"(Legal Practice Review Act Issues Chapter, 
review by Sallman PA & Wright RT at 11) the Benchmarks for Industry-Based Customer 
Dispute Resolution Schemes were produced by the Commonwealth Department of 
Industry, Science and Tourism in 1997.  The Benchmarks are industry-based models of 
complaint resolution. The Benchmarks identify the following benchmarks for use in the 





 Efficiency  
 Effectiveness 
 
In its Preface the Benchmarks describes its purpose as 3 fold: 
1. act as a guide to good practice  
2. provide objective guidance on practices to aim for in their operations 
3. serve as a guide for consumers to give them an idea of what they should expect 
from such schemes 
Stating: 
The benchmarks are constituted by key practices which it is 
hoped many schemes will adopt.  However, it is recognized 
that some key practices in the benchmarks may not be 
applicable to the small sectors of industry or those sectors 
where there are few complaints.  Each key practice does 
not have to be adopted by each industry sector.  Industries 
should consider the applicability of each of the key 
practices to their sector taking in to account the industry's 
size, resources and complaint history.  However, where 
possible, the use of these benchmarks by all customer 
dispute schemes is encouraged. 
 
In 1999 the Federal Government funded 437 interviews with consumers covering 11 
schemes,  5 State and Territory Consumer and Small Claims Tribunals as well as 6 
industry-based customer dispute resolution schemes was undertaken by the Consumer 
Affairs Division. This survey was based upon 4 of the key principles (2 could not be 
measured - independence and accountability) from the Benchmarks - access; fairness; 
efficiency; effectiveness the report concluded "…that the industry-based customer 
dispute resolution schemes are working well.  A similar conclusion can also be drawn for 
the Courts and Tribunals." (Report by the Commonwealth Department of the Treasury 
consumerredressstudy, June 1999 at 26). 
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There are clear weaknesses in adopting this form of voluntary regulation.  For example, 
in terms of regulation the Benchmarks would appear to not be legally binding upon 
industry.  Similarly to Codes Of Practice, courts will be reluctant to interpret the 
Benchmarks as enforceable (Submission to the TaskForce on Industry Self-regulation by 
the NSW Legal Aid Commission dated December 1999). Courts have refused to interpret 
Codes of Practice as enforceable on 2 grounds: 
1. the Code is typically not part of the contract between the service provider and the 
consumer and so will not be interpreted as conferring additional rights to those 
under the contract; and 
2. the broad language of the Codes is not consistent with them being found 
enforceable by consumers (John Murphy and Others v Overton Investments and 
Anor at 18 Unreported decision of 3 September 1998 cited in See submission to 
the Task Force on Industry Self-regulation by the NSW Legal Aid Commission 
dated December 1999 at 1).  
Given that the Benchmarks likewise are formulated in the "broad language of policy 
objectives rather than the more precise language suited to a contractual relationship" John 
Murphy and Others v Overton Investments and Anor at 18 Unreported decision of 3 
September per Fitzgerald AJA) it seems unlikely the Benchmarks will be viewed by the 
courts to be legally binding forms of regulation. 
 
Clearly the Benchmarks have weaknesses in terms of enforceability, their voluntary take-
up and the lack of sanctions they enforce.  That said the Benchmarks nevertheless have 
an important function in setting a minimum as to acceptable standards for an ADR 
scheme. Without the existence of these Benchmarks there would be no expectation of 
industry dispute resolution performance.  While the Benchmarks may not benefit an 
individual consumer they clearly allow the broader consumer movement to measure and 
evaluate performance against a generic standard.  
 
Standards Australia  
Standards Australia is the peak national standards body in Australia.   Standards Australia 
is a public company limited by guarantee that has existed for 77 years.  Similarly to the 
Benchmarks the adoption of standards issued by Standards Australia is voluntary, the 
decision of industry.  The "whole fabric of Standards Australia's existence is based on the 
principle of voluntary adoption of Australian standards and our other normative 
documents by industry and business"  (Correspondence by Ross Wraight to Chair, 
Taskforce on Industry Self-Regulation 10 December available from 
<www.treasury.gov.au/publications/consumeraffairs/industryself-regulation> 
26/04/2002)   
 
There are two standards which are applicable to private industry dispute resolution: 
 AS4269-1995 states that it is a Standard "which sets out the essential elements 
for the management of complaints from inception to satisfaction of final 
determination"  (AS 4269-1995 at 4).   Created by AS4269 represents national 
standards for a complaint handling framework for complainants as well as 
complaint recipients.   
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 AS4608-1999 a standard which is a "guide for the prevention, handling and 
resolution of disputes'. It aims to "improve existing approaches and practices' to 
disputes and conflicts within and between businesses. (see Executive summary) 
 
It is the Benchmarks together with the above Standards which have been specifically 
developed for private industry complaint handling bodies.  Naturally consumers do not 
lose access to other laws such as statutes (eg: Trade Practices Act) and common law (eg: 
negligence) simply by choosing to access the private industry scheme.  Indeed statute and 
common law plays a crucial role in the overall framework of consumer protection.  
However in keeping with the concept of self regulation the specific consumer objectives 
for these industry schemes are up to the industry to adopt.  Arguably for every 
disadvantage there is a comparable advantage for consumers: 
 While the adoption of the regulation is voluntary there is a government 
expectation that industry will adopt the voluntary measures (in line with the 
carrot/stick approach to self-regulation described above. 
 While the regulation is not law the very looseness of the regulatory measures has 
the capacity to allow for tripartite discussion on regulation between industry, 
consumers and government; 
 While such standards are not enforceable they provide standards of appropriate 
behaviour that are transparent, accessable and undertsandable. 
 In relation to reviews, Benchmark practice requires that external dispute 
resolution schemes are subject to independent review every 3 years  (PS 139 92 
and the Commonwealth Benchmarks at 6.11; letter by Consumer Law Center 
Victoria to Stephen Rimmer, Dept of Treasury and Finance dated 19 May 2000).  
However the CLCV notes that in practice across a range of industries such 




It has been suggested that "[B]est practice dictates that industry does not exercise control 
over its own regulation"  (Submission to Victorian Legal Practice Act 1996 Review - 
Discussion Chapter by Federation of Community Legal Centres of Victoria at 3). Based 
upon this view it could be suggested that private industry dispute resolution schemes are 
attracting consumer complaints at an exponential growth rate not only because they offer 
an alternative to courts but because they also involve tripartite interests - industry, 
consumer and government.  While the interaction between these interests are not always 
equal nor necessarily transparent, the existence of these tripartite interests is constant: 
industry will be involved as it is required to by government and has an interest in keeping 
its own dispute resolution schemes; consumers naturally have concerns over service 
quality and dispute resolution and government "..may privatise but it cannot abandon its 
responsibilities for appropriate regulation and grievance redress."  (Birkinshaw P 
Grievances, Remedies and the State, 2
nd
 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994 at 1).   
 
However, there is a diversity of views upon the regulatory mix which is required to 
ensure consumers are able to have their disputes resolved effectively and interests 
advanced by industry.  Indeed, there seems to be no general agreement upon what the 
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current regulatory mix for industry dispute resolution schemes actually is.  For example it 
has been argued that the same schemes is self- regulatory as well as being co-regulatory 
(eg: TIO).  Given this disparity of views it is difficult to argue a 'solution' for consumers.  
While these schemes have advantages and disadvantages at minimum they offer 
consumers an avenue of redress which is separate and alternative to the courts - arguably 
an avenue that supplements rather than removes the ability of an individual consumer to 
have a dispute resolved with private industry.  
 
